Motivated by an application in highway pricing, we consider the problem that consists in setting profit-maximizing tolls on a clique subset of a multicommodity transportation network. Following a proof that clique pricing is N P-hard, we propose strong valid inequalities, some of which define facets of the 2-commodity polyhedron. The numerical efficiency of these inequalities is assessed by embedding them within a branch-and-cut framework.
Introduction
The paradigm of pricing, either for improving the performance of infrastructures, or for maximizing the revenue of a private firm, pervades the economics literature. In the present paper, we consider the problem faced by a highway manager that seeks to maximize the revenue raised from tolls set on a network, while anticipating that users will travel on paths that maximize their individual utilities. This situation is closely related to the problem known as 'product line pricing' (see Green and Krieger [11] , Dobson and Kalish [9, 10] ), which was proved to be challenging from both the theoretical and computational points of view. Some years ago, Labbé et al. [19] recognized that the network pricing problem fits the framework of bilevel programming, a branch of optimization concerned with the solution of nonconvex programs involving two noncooperative agents, and that is akin to a leader-follower, or Stackelberg, game. This approach led to studies that focused on the combinatorial nature of network pricing, either in its original formulation or variants thereof. Representative of this approach are the works of Bouhtou et al. [1] , van Hoesel et al. [23] , Grigoriev et al. [12] , Heilporn et al. [15] , Kohli and Krishnamurti [17] and Roch et al. [20] .
In the present paper, we consider a variant of the problem where all roads controlled by an authority are connected and form a path, as occurs in toll highways. Assuming that tolls are levied with respect to all possible combinations of entry and exit points on the highway, one may focus on networks where a virtual arc is created for each entry-exit combination, and thus form an 'inner' clique. Shortest paths that do not go through the highway are represented by arcs linking the various origins and destinations, and form an 'outer' clique (see Figure 1 ). The aim of this paper is to provide a better understanding of the Clique Pricing Problem and to develop algorithmic tools that can be transposed to situations arising in the field of revenue management (see Côté et al. [5] ). More precisely, we are interested in the polyhedral structure of a specific Network Pricing Problem. Note that preliminary results were obtained by Heilporn et al. [16] , who provided a theoretical study of the single commodity Clique Pricing Problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the Clique Pricing Problem, together with its formulation; Section 3 deals with strong valid inequalities derived from the underlying network structure of the model; Section 4 provides proofs that the inequalities, as well as several constraints of the initial model, define facets of the two-commodity problem; finally, numerical results (Section 5) show that several of the valid inequalities are efficient, in the sense that their integration within a branch-and-cut scheme decreases the integrality gap, CPU time and number of nodes explored in the resulting implicit enumeration process.
Mathematical formulation of the Clique Pricing Problem
Let us consider a linear highway composed of n entry-exit nodes, over which may transit m commodities, each of them associated with an origin-destination pair k ∈ K and a demand η k .
To each entry-exit pair correspond an arc a ∈ A and a commodity-specific cost c k a + t a , where t a is a toll. Commodities can either transit through the toll network, at cost c k a + t a , or use alternative direct paths at cost u k . Assuming that all combinations of origin-destination and entry-exit nodes are present, the topology of the network is that of two cliques linked by 'access nodes' (see Figure 1) . The 'outer' clique is related to demand, while the 'inner' clique is a Following Dewez [7] , the Clique Pricing Problem can be formulated as the bilevel program:
subject to:
(x, y) ∈ arg min 
x k a ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A.
At the upper level, the authority seeks to maximize the profits earned by imposing tolls t a on the inner clique arcs. At the lower level, commodities are assigned to shortest paths with respect to the sum of fixed costs and tolls. The flow constraints (4) ensure that each commodity k ∈ K is assigned either to a toll path a of the inner clique (x k a = 1), or to a toll-free path of the outer clique (y k = 1). Note that lower level solutions represent origin-destination paths carrying either no flow or the total origin-destination flow. Since the matrix of constraints is totally unimodular, flow proportions x k a and y k can be assumed either discrete or continuous. It has been proved that the Clique Pricing Problem is N P-hard (see Heilporn [14] ), although particular cases are polynomially solvable (see Dewez [7] 
where M k a and N a denote 'big-M' constants that can be set to M k a = max{0, u k − c k a } and N a = max k∈K M k a for all k ∈ K, a ∈ A. Let one identify A with a set of products, K with a set of purchaser segments, and u k −c k a def = r k a with 'reservation prices' that represent the maximal price that purchaser k is willing to spend for product a. Then, if the 'utility' of purchaser k towards product a is set to the difference between the reservation price r k a and the actual product price p k a , the Clique Pricing Problem can be cast within the framework of product pricing problems, which have been studied in the economics literature (see Green and Krieger [11] , Dobson and Kalish [9, 10] , Kohli et al. [17, 18] or Shioda et al. [22] ). For one, Shioda et al. [22] proposed a MIP formulation which coincides with CP, modulo the substitution of the Shortest Path constraints (8) by
which, after adding the term (u k − c k a )x k a − p k a to both sides of the inequality, can be rewritten as
If one expresses constraints (8) as
it can be readily verified that the right-hand-side of (16) is smaller than that of (15) , whenever c k a is less than u k . Note that, in a pre-processing step, one could have set x k a = 0 for all a ∈ A and k ∈ K such that c k a > u k , since such an arc does not contribute positively to the objective function. Hence one may conclude that the Shortest Path constraints are stronger than (14) . In particular, if a consumer k ∈ K refrains from buying, constraints (14) are redundant for this k, while constraints (8) impose u k ≤ c k a + t a for all toll arcs a ∈ A. In a related paper, Shioda et al. [21] described the purchaser's behavior by probabilistic choice models. From the latter, they derived several mixed integer programming programs that they compare in terms of optimal solutions and computational times.
Shioda et al. [22] also introduced three sets of valid inequalities, the first set corresponding to optimality cuts and the next two to feasibility cuts:
∀k 1 , k 2 ∈ K, ∀a ∈ A that satisfy the conditions :
Inequalities (17) and (18) provide lower and upper bounds on the product price variables p k a , which depend on the reservation prices u k − c k a . Inequalities (19) link the flow variables x k a associated with purchaser segments. We refer the reader to Shioda et al. [22] for further details concerning these inequalities.
Valid Inequalities
Inequalities (8) , which ensure that only shortest paths are allowed to carry positive flow, can be strengthened by considering interrelationships between pairs of commodities.
Proposition 1 (SSP inequalities) For any subset S of A and for any a ∈ A, the inequalities
are valid for CP. (10) and (11), the inequalities imply that the cost of the path containing b ∈ A must be larger than the cost of the toll free path for commodity k 1 , and are valid by (8) and (12) .
(ii) In all other cases, (20) 
a for all a ∈ A and u k 1 ≤ u k 1 , respectively, which are valid by (8) . Now assume that there exists b ∈ A such that x
for all a ∈ A and p (10) and (11) , the inequalities state that the path containing b ∈ A must be cheaper than the path containing d ∈ A for commodity k 1 , and are valid by (8) and (12) .
(ii) In all other cases (i.e., if there does not exist any d ∈ A \ (S ∪ {a}) such that x
a for all a ∈ A and p
Thus the path containing b ∈ A must be cheaper than any other path for commodity k 1 , and the validity of the inequalities follows from (8) .
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Note that, in the above theorem, the only relevant constraints are those that satisfy c
for all b ∈ A \ (S ∪ {a}), since the remaining ones are weaker than the Shortest Path constraints.
Although the possible number of subsets S, and hence the number of constraints (20)- (21), is exponential, it is yet possible to determine the most violated constraint in polynomial time.
To outline the separation procedure for a given commodity k 1 , we observe that, for a distinct commodity k 2 and an arc a, the right-hand-side of (20) will be minimal if we insert into the set A \ (S ∪ {a}) all arcs for which p
b and the costs c k 1 a are both sorted in increasing order (the latter operation can be performed off-line), then it becomes straightforward to update the optimal set S when switching from one candidate toll arc to its successor in the ordered list. The complexity of the separation procedure for a commodity k 1 ∈ K is thus dominated by the sort operation, and is in the order of O(|K||A| log |A|).
The Profit Upper Bound inequalities (9) can also be strengthened by considering pairs of commodities. In this context, we say that two toll arcs a and b are compatible with respect to commodities k 1 and k 2 if there exists a feasible solution of CP where x
b by the Shortest Path constraints (8) . This yields c 
The remaining Shortest Path constraints hold since variables t d have been set sufficiently large for all d ∈ A \ {a, b}. Further, c (9) are satisfied. In the same way, if c
Proof Since (9), (10) and (11) . Hence t a ≤ M k 2 a , i.e., the path containing toll arc a ∈ A is cheaper than the toll free path for commodity k 2 .
To derive the next inequalities, we introduce the set A > a = {b ∈ A : c
(for the sake of readibility, we adopted this notation rather than A ≤ a ).
b , then the following inequalities are valid
Note that, for given k 1 , k 2 ∈ K and a ∈ A, inequality (22) (resp. (23)) is not redundant if and only if x
, and helps to restrain the upper bound on p k 2 a in this case.
is non negative, then the corresponding inequality (22) is redundant by (9) . Similarly, if b∈A
Further, Lemma 1 and the definition of the set A < a yield d ∈ A < a , thus d = a by (ii), i.e., x k 2 a = 1. Now, from Lemma 1 and the assumption that there does not exist any b ∈ A such that c
, whose validity follows from (9), (10) and (11). Concerning inequality (23) , it can occur that b∈A
b . In this situation, Lemma 2 implies that there must exist d ∈ A such that x (10) and (11), one has p k 2 a ≤ M
Proposition 3 (SPUB inequalities) Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 the following inequalities are valid:
Note that, for given k 1 , k 2 ∈ K and a ∈ A, (24)- (25) are not redundant either if
Since the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2, it will be omitted.
Assessing the valid inequalities
The valid inequalities introduced in Section 3 are strong. Indeed, we will show that they define facets of the convex hull P of feasible solutions to a two-commodity Clique Pricing Problem, defined as
where boldface letters denote real vectors.
Our results are dependent on the choice of big-M constants in the MIP formulation of clique pricing. While we let M k a = max{0, u k − c k a } as before, we set N a = max k∈K {M k a } + , for some arbitrarily small number . This latter choice, which differs from that in Section 2, is motivated by the fact that some flexibility with respect to the toll variables t a is required whenever we encounter the degenerate situation where some toll arc carries no flow. For sufficiently small , this strategy leaves the set of optimal solutions unchanged.
In the sequel, e a will denote a unit vector in the direction a, and the following technical assumptions will hold.
Both assumptions ensure that the convex hull is not contained in some hyperplane, either p k a = 0 in the former case, or
in the latter, i.e, the cost structure is identical for commodities k 1 and k 2 , and it becomes a single-commodity problem.
It can be proved that the polyhedron P is full dimensional and that most of the constraints in our formulation are tight, i.e., they induce facets of the convex hull of feasible solutions, under mild conditions. For the sake of completeness, these results, whose proofs can be found in Heilporn [14] , are listed below.
Proposition 4
The polyhedron P has full dimension, i.e., Dim (P) = 5n.
a defines a facet of P if and only if either M
Proposition 8 Constraints (11) are never facet defining for P.
Proposition 9
The constraint p k 2 a ≥ 0 defines a facet of P if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
One can also show that most inequalities introduced in Section 3 define facets of P. To prove such results, let (t; p k 1 ; p k 2 ; x k 1 ; x k 2 ) ∈ P and H the hyperplane induced by a given inequality. We need to show that H is the sole hyperplane that contains P ∩ H
and assume that all points of P ∩H lie on a generic hyperplane G = (t; p; x) :
The following lemmas relate the coefficients of H and G. (ii) If (i) holds and there exists b ∈ A such that ξ
a∈A N a e a ; 0; 0; 0; 0 and a∈A N a e a − e b ; 0; 0; 0; 0 belong to P ∩ H for all b ∈ A. As these points also belong to the generic hyperplane G, it follows that
a∈A\{b} N a e a ; 0; 0; e b ; e b belongs to P ∩ H, and one obtains γ
a∈A\{b} N a e a + e b ; e b ; e b ; e b ; e b also belongs to P ∩ H, which yields β
Lemma 4 Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩ H and M 
Lemma 5 Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩H, and b, d ∈ A be such that c
Lemma 6 Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩ H and let b ∈ A be such that M
b e b ; 0; e b belong to P ∩ H. As µ = 0, we have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. It follows that γ
Lemma 7 Let G be a hyperplane containing P ∩ H and let b ∈ A such that M
Proof As previously, we have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. Since the points
The result follows.
Based on the previous lemmas, we are in position to prove that most SSP and SPUB inequalities presented in Section 3 define facets of P.
b for all b ∈ S ⊆ A, then the SSP inequalities (21) define facets of P.
Proof First note that inequality (21) can be rewritten as
= 0 . We have that α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. Further, for any b ∈ S, and provided that M 
, switching the commodity indices k 1 and k 2 in Lemma 6 (resp. Lemma 7) yields γ The SSP inequalities (20) can also define facets of P. However, since this only occurs under restrictive conditions, it will not be mentioned any further in this paper. Next, we turn our attention to the SPUB inequalities, which also define facets of P.
Proposition 11
Under the assumption that, for all b ∈ A > a such that M
then the SPUB inequalities (22) define facets of P.
Proof Letã ∈ A and
By Lemma 3, α = 0 and δ = 0, and β
b , switching the commodity indices k 1 and k 2 in Lemma 4 yields β b − c
The proof of the next result is deferred to the appendix.
, then the SPUB inequalities (23) define facets of P.
Next, we address the case of the SPUB inequalities (24) and (25) .
Proposition 13 If the following conditions hold:
then the SPUB inequalities (24) define facets of P. The final result is stated without proof.
Proposition 14
If the following conditions hold:
then the SPUB inequalities (25) define facets of P.
Note that the conditions imposed so that inequalities (24)-(25) define facets of P are similar to the ones imposed for inequalities (22) - (23) . Since most inequalities considered define facets of the two-commodity case, we can expect that they provide deep cuts for the general case, and help in the numerical solution of the Clique Pricing Problem. This will be the topic of the remainder of this work.
Numerical results for a branch-and-cut algorithm
In this section, we show that the SSP and SPUB inequalities introduced previously are not only tight for 2-commodity problems, but are also efficient, from an algorithmic point of view, for both the Clique Pricing Problem and an interesting variant thereof.
Problem generation
In order to test our valid inequalities, we generated scenarios built around the topology of Highway 10 in Québec (Canada). These involve a complete network based on 5 to 10 cities and 10 to 15 entry-exit nodes on the highway, i.e., 20 to 90 commodities and 90 to 210 toll arcs. For each scenario, replicated 5 times, demands for city pairs were set to random values between 10 and 100. The set-up of the cost structure is as follows:
• Consecutive toll roads on the highway are assigned random fixed costs between 20 and 70;
• Arcs in opposite directions are assigned identical fixed costs;
• Fixed costs on shortest toll-free roads linking the highway with cities are set to random numbers between 15 and 120;
• Fixed costs are additive, i.e., the cost of a 'virtual' arc in the inner clique composed of a sequence of 'physical' roads is set to the the sum of the latter fixed costs;
• Fixed costs between cities are set to random numbers between 150 and 1000.
• Toll arcs a ∈ A such that c k a > u k are clearly irrelevant, and are removed from the network. 
Implementation
Computational experiments were performed under scenarios involving the valid inequalities introduced in this work. These inequalities were computed at the root node of the branch-and-cut tree, and appended to the model, whenever they were violated. At each iteration, violation tests were conducted, and the number of SSP inequalities appended was limited to half the number of commodities. Finally, we set a computational time upper bound of 5 hours (18000 seconds), after which the solution process was halted.
In order to assess the efficiency of the valid inequalities, the related number of nodes, CPU times and the gap (in percentage) between the linear relaxation optimal solution Z lp and the true optimal solution Z opt , defined as
are reported. Note that Z lp is computed after appending the valid inequalities, at the root of the branch-and-cut algorithm.
The models were implemented under Mosel of Xpress-MP, Optimizer version 18. All automated preprocessing features were switched on, although Xpress' automated heuristics were switched off, being unable to handle our manual cuts. Numerical experiments were carried out on a Pentium 4.3 GHz processor equipped with 2Gb of RAM and running under Linux Kernel version 2.6.4.
Numerical results for the Clique Pricing Problem
In this section, we assess the influence of the valid inequalities when integrated within a branchand-cut scheme. The results are displayed in Tables 2-5 . For the instances that could be solved to optimality within the allotted CPU time, we observe a sharp decrease in both the gap and number of nodes, when the SSP inequalities were incorporated. For all but the smallest instances, we also observed a sharp drop in the CPU time. However, merging both classes of valid inequalities (i.e., SSP and SPUB) did not yield a significant improvement in any of the performance measures. The typical evolution of the objective's lower and upper bounds is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 The base model CP. The symbols µ and σ denote the average and standard deviation with respect to the instances solved to optimality, while 'nodes' refers to the number of nodes in the branch-and-bound process. Leftmost numbers (between stars) provide the number of instances that could not be solved to proven optimality within the time limit.
Next, we compare the efficiency of our formulation with that of Shioda et al.'s SHPP, under valid inequalities (17) , (18) and (19) . We base our tests on the randomly generated instances described in Section 5.1. Inequalities (17) and (18) are appended to the initial model, while inequalities (19) are generated at the root of the branch-and-cut tree but only appended to the model when violated. The results obtained are presented in Table 6 . Comparing Table 4 : Appending the SPUB inequalities (22)- (23) and (24)- (25). (20)- (21) and the SPUB inequalities (22)- (23) and (24)- (25) .
to Tables 2-5 , we observe that model CP with or even without the valid inequalities clearly outperforms Shioda et al.'s formulation. This confirms that constraints (14) of SHPP are weaker, both theoretically and numerically, than constraints (8).
It is worth noting that Shioda et al.'s study was concerned with a product pricing problem unrelated to a specific network. For the sake of fairness, we now present numerical results obtained on a set of product pricing problems, generated as described in [22] . Precisely, we consider a number of purchaser segments ('commodities' in the network model) and a number of products ('toll arcs'), randomly generated within the intervals [40, 80] and [10, 60] , respectively. Table 6 : Model SHPP with inequalities (17), (18) and (19) .
Each customer k is associated with a random demand η k ∈ [500, 799] and a reservation price r k a ∈ [512, 1023] for product a, the latter corresponding to shortest toll-free arcs in the network model. The results are displayed in Tables 7 and 8 , where the behaviour observed earlier gets even more pronounced.
A variant of the Clique Pricing Problem
In the original formulation of the Clique Pricing Problem, an optimal solution might be such that the sum of the tolls on consecutive arcs between two nodes i and j is less than the toll on (20)- (21), (22)- (23) and (24)- (25), tested on Shioda et al.
instances.
where h(a) and t(a) denote the head and tail of a ∈ A, respectively. In a similar fashion, we introduce monotonicity inequalities that specify that the toll on a path cannot be less than the toll on any subpath, i.e., the inequality t a ≥ t b holds for any pair of arcs (a, b) ∈ A × A such that one of the following four conditions involving their indices holds:
The model involving triangle and monotonicity constraints is labelled CP * . Note that constants N a : a ∈ A that appear in constraints (10) can now be set to N a = N = max k,a {M k a } for all a ∈ A.
Triangle and monotonicity constraints are generated at every node of the branch-and-cut algorithm and appended to model CP * when violated. We impose an upper bound on the number of constraints appended at a single iteration of the branch-and-cut algorithm. For a given commodity, this bound is set to half the maximal number of feasible paths for the triangle constraints, and to twice that number for the monotonicity constraints. Random instances were generated according to the rules set in Section 5.1. Based on monotonicity constraints, a variable x k a (a ∈ A, k ∈ K) was set to zero whenever there exists an arc b such that c k b < c k a and b lies in-between t(a) and h(a). This allowed to significantly reduce the number of admissible paths. Table 9 provides the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of the number of feasible paths per commodity.
The numerical results, displayed in Tables 10-12 (20)- (21).
We conclude that the best valid inequalities for this variant of the Clique Pricing Problem are still the SSP inequalities (20)- (21), as they provide a significant decrease of the gap and number of nodes in the branch-and-cut algorithm, at the expense of increasing the CPU time.
To illustrate the results, Figures 4 and 5 depict the evolution of the lower and upper bounds on the objective function with respect to the CPU time for two specific instances. (20)- (21), (22)- (23) and (24)- (25) . 
Conclusion
Together with its companion paper [16] , the present work constitutes the first systematic study of the polyhedral properties of network pricing, or its equivalent in economics. In particular,
we showed that a class of theoretically strong inequalities performed well numerically. As a follow-up, it would be interesting to investigate the polyhedral structure of a problem involving fixed costs on the toll arcs of the associated network design and pricing problem (see Brotcorne et al. [3] ) akin to 'product line design' in the economics literature [9] .
Appendix. Proofs of Theorems 12 and 14
The proofs require the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Assume that P ∩H is a subset of a the generic hyperplane G, and let b, d ∈ A such that c
b . If the coefficients of H are such that µ = 0, ξ
First, one knows that µ = 0 implies α = 0 and δ = 0 by Lemma 3. Then, if M
Proof of Theorem 12
Let H = (t; p; x) : p
First of all, Lemma 3 yields α = 0, δ = 0 and β
Without loss of generality, let us assume that c 
Proof of Theorem 14
Lemma 3 yields α = 0, δ = 0, β 
